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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TORTS
Dale E. Bennett*
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--LAST CLEAR CHANCE
In Flanders v. Arkansas and Louisiana Missouri Railway
Company' the plaintiff sought to recover for the loss of his truck
which had been demolished in a collision caused at least in part
by the negligent operation of defendant's train. The truck owner
sought to insulate the effect of his own contributory negligence,
in parking the truck on the track, by alleging that those operating
the train had seen the truck and thus "had the last clear chance
of avoiding the accident." (Italics supplied.) If it had been
established that the train operators had actually been aware of
the truck's dangerous position on the tracks, the plaintiff's last
clear chance argument would have been sustained. 2 In such cases
the courts have broadly stated that the plaintiff's negligence was
a "remote cause" of the accident, and, conversely, that the rail-
road's negligence was the "proximate cause" thereof. Actually,
the controlling legal principle has been the fact that the defen-
dant was actually aware of the danger and had a real "last clear
chance" to avoid the collision. However, the preponderance of
the somewhat conflicting testimony in the instant case bore out
the brakeman's testimony that those operating the train had no
actual knowledge of the truck's position on the track. Thus a
case of concurring negligence was presented-where both the
plaintiff's employees and the operators of defendant's train had
failed to take proper precautions. Under those *circumstances the
plaintiff's contributing negligence barred his recovery, and the
doctrine of last clear chance had no applicability.
The Missouri "humanitarian doctrine" has extended the last
clear chance rule by charging a defendant operating a dangerous
instrumentality (such as a railroad train) with knowledge of
the plaintiff's peril, whether he actually saw it or should have
seen it with a proper lookout.8 This rule is bottomed on the idea
that the driver of the more dangerous vehicle is under a special
duty to be ever alert, because of the great potentiality for harm
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 La. 193, 56 So. 2d 151 (1951).
2. Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935); Russo v. Texas
Pac. Ry., 189 La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (1938).
3. Womack v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S.W. 2d 368 (1935);
Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 St. Louis L. Rev. 113
(1935).
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of the instrumentality he is handling. In reply, one may inquire
why the driver of an automobile approaching a known crossing
can exact greater care of the railway engineer than he takes for
his own safety. It is not surprising that such an inequitable rule
has led to confusion in its application, and has received scant
judicial approval outside the jurisdiction of its origin. 4
Some support for the so-called humantiarian doctrine is to
be found in the Louisiana cases. In Iglesias v. Campbell5 a similar
principle was applied to permit recovery for injury to a child who
while jay-walking was struck by defendant's car. In holding that
the driver's negligence was "the proximate cause" of the accident
the court declared, "It is an inexorable rule of law that the oper-
ator of an automobile is held to see that which he should have
seen." Similarly in Jackson v. Cook6 the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed ".. . the well-recognized and settled rule that the
duty of those in charge of motor cars and engines to look ahead
and observe never ceases; that what they can see they must see
and in legal contemplation they do see; that their failure to see
what they could have seen by the exercise of due diligence does
not absolve them from liability."
Those who, like the writer, doubt the logic or justice of the
Missouri rule will find real comfort in the recent case of Bergeron
v. Department of Highways.7 In that decision the Louisiana
Supreme Court has apparently limited its holding in the Cook
case to the facts of that case, that is, where the drunken plain-
tiff's negligence was "passive, as distinguished from active negli-
gence." The opinion in the Bergeron case was somewhat in the
nature of dictum, since there was a serious question as to whether
defendant's truck driver was negligent in failing to see the
approaching bicycle as he proceeded to make his left turn across
the sidewalk. Yet the court made it abundantly clear that if
there was negligence, the fault of the injured cyclist, who ran
head-on intg the turning truck, was such as to bar any recovery.8
Justice LeBlanc's carefully written opinion definitely shows that
Louisiana is not ready to subscribe to the Missouri "humani-
tarian doctrine," which charges the driver of the more dangerous
4. See Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts 414 (1941).
5. 175 So. 145 (La. App. 1937). Accord: Law v. Osterland, 3 So. 2d 674
(La. App. 1941).
6. 189 La. 860, 868, 181 So. 195, 197 (1938).
7. 60 So. 2d 4 (La. 1952).
8. "It was the bicycle rider who had the better opportunity to observe the
situation and apprehend the danger before it became imminent." 60 So.
2d 4, &
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vehicle with a last clear chance which he did not in fact have.
"The doctrine of the last clear chance," affirms Justice LeBlanc,
"is one involving nice distinctions, often of a technical nature, and
courts should be wary in extending its application."9
DEFAMATION-PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS
The general rule that false defamatory statements are action-
able is subject to an exception in cases where the words are
spoken in protecting a socially recognized interest. To come
within this exception the words must be spoken to a person to
whom the knowledge is likely to prove material in protecting
the speaker's interest. In such cases a qualified privilege is found
to exist and no cause of action for defamation arises if the untrue
statement is made in good faith and without malice. In Jones v.
Hansen.10 the secretary of a local labor union in his official capacity
notified employers having contracts with the union that certain
disciplined members were not in good standing. Assuming the
statement to have been false when made, which appears highly
doubtful from the reported facts, a qualified privilege existed and
the circumstances were clearly such as to raise an inference of
good faith and proper motives."
The more complete protection of an absolute privilege is gen-
erally accorded to participants in judicial proceedings. It is impor-
tant that the judge on the bench, witnesses, attorneys and liti-
gants shall be able to speak freely and without fear of conse-
quences. Thus the common law grants a complete immunity as
to any defamatory statements made in court, even though the
statement may be known to be false and is motivated by ill will.
12
Louisiana has recognized an absolute privilege as to judicial
statements, and as to testimony which is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the matter in controversy.' 3 However, only a
qualified privilege has been accorded to parties litigant and their
attorneys.' 4 Here there is not the same urgent necessity for an
9. 60 So. 2d 4, 8, quoting from Hutcheson v. Misenheime1f, 169 Va. 511,
516-517, 194 S.E. 665, 667 (1938).
10. 220 La. 673, 57 So. 2d 224 (1952).
11. Any possible contrary inference was completely dispelled by the fact
that after the National Executive Committee referred the disciplinary action
back for further consideration the defendant Immediately sent out notices
that the members might be employed.
12. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts 823 (1941).
13. Art. 50, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:50; Oakes v. Walther,
179 La. 365, 154 So. 26 (1934).
14. Art. 49(4), La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:49(4); Lescale v.
Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1906); Dunn v. Southern Ins. Co., 116
La. 431, 40 So. 786 (1906).
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absolute freedom of expression. Waldo v. Morrison15 presented a
case of rather strong statements by counsel for one of the parties
in a controversy over the disposition of a decedent's estate. Attor-
neys for the daughter had stated in a brief opposing the son's
motion for a new trial that the son "did not even have the com-
mon decency to take the time to attend his mother's funeral, and
yet has months of time to spend squeezing the last penny out of
his mother's estate" and had further referred to the son's "nig-
gardly position" in the litigation. Justice Moise reiterated Loui-
siana's prior position that parties litigant and their attorneys
have only a "qualified" privilege, but did not feel that the state-
ments made were "without probable cause" or motivated by
malice. Conceding that the statements were "inaccurate," the
court concluded that "each was pertinent to the strenuous and
bitter litigation between plaintiff and his sister... involving their
mother's succession. Furthermore, the extrinsic circumstances of
plaintiff's actions constituted probable cause for the statements
made."1 6 In short, while Louisiana does not grant an absolute
privilege to parties litigant and their attorneys, false defamatory
statements will not be actionable unless they are clearly irrele-
vant, or obviously unreasonable. Otherwise the propriety of the
defendant's motives will be presumed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
George W. Pugh*
FAILURE OF INSURER TO MAKE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIM
Over the dissenting opinions of Justices LeBlanc and Hami-
ter, the Supreme Court held that the penalty provisions of R.S.
22:658 are applicable to workmen's compensation insurers. Writ-
ing the majority opinion in Wright v. National Surety Corpora-
tion,' Justice McCaleb found that an employee is an insured
within the meaning of this penal provision of the Insurance Code.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the
section of the Employer's Liability Act 2 which provides (1) that
a workmen's compensation insurance policy shall be "construed
to be a direct obligation by the insurer to the person entitled to
15. 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952).
16. 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210, 212.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor,
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW. ,
1. 221 La. 486, 59 So. 2d 695 (1952).
2. La. R.S. 1950, 23:1162.
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